Tag Archives: BMS-863233 (XL-413)

When the message of a speaker goes beyond the literal or

When the message of a speaker goes beyond the literal or logical meaning of the sentences used a is required to understand the BMS-863233 (XL-413) complete meaning of an utterance. two experiments point to a deficit in generating alternate interpretations beyond a logical reading. bvFTD individuals thus prefer the narrowly literal or logical interpretation of a scalar term BMS-863233 (XL-413) when they must generate a possible alternative interpretation by themselves but patients prefer a pragmatic reading when offered a choice between the logical and the pragmatic interpretation of the same phrase. An imaging analysis links bvFTD individuals’ spontaneous inclination toward a narrowly logical interpretation with atrophy in ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Our findings are consistent with the because the use of a term like “some” in (1a) shows that the speaker had a reason not to make use of a term like “all”. Scalar implicatures are a good example of that happen whenever we need to integrate contextual info with linguistic info to completely understand the meaning of a statement. There is a variation to be made between the and the the speaker’s meaning: and to the same degree as adults. In one of Noveck’s (2001) experiments most children approved sentences such as “Some giraffes have very long necks” while adults tended to reject them as false (on the grounds that all giraffes have very long necks). This effect has proven to be powerful in multiple studies (e.g. Guasti et al. 2005 BMS-863233 (XL-413) Pouscoulou Noveck Politzer & Bastide 2007 The cognitive processes and the neural basis for this kind of inference making are beginning to become determined. Previous studies pointed to the contribution of a prefrontal network in the processing of a scalar inference. Shetreet and colleagues BMS-863233 (XL-413) (Shetreet Chierchia & Gaab 2014 showed a critical part for orbitofrontal cortex (BA 47) in the computation of a scalar inference. BA 47 has been extensively implicated in executive functions like mental flexibility (Abe & Lee 2011 O’Doherty Critchley Deichmann & Dolan BMS-863233 (XL-413) 2003 In the same study Shetreet and colleagues found activations in medial prefrontal cortex (BA10) which they linked with the acknowledgement of the mismatch between context and statements. Others have demonstrated the part of medial prefrontal areas RGS1 in appreciating mismatches on actions of Theory of Mind (Amodio & Frith 2006 Ferstl & von Cramon 2002 Rilling Sanfey Aronson Nystrom & Cohen 2004 Saxe 2006 In the present paper we present two experiments that aim to investigate a specific aspect of pragmatic inference-making (e.g. Davies & Katsos 2010 Katsos & Bishop 2011 Arguably the most used paradigm for screening the comprehension of scalar implicatures especially in the developmental literature is the binary view task. In this task the participant is definitely asked to express a binary view (e.g. true or false) in instances in which an utterance provides an underinformative description BMS-863233 (XL-413) of a stimulus picture. Consider the utterance: (2) “Some of the pet cats are in the package.” Now pair this having a pictured array in which all the pet cats are in the package. If the utterance is definitely accepted as a good description of the array the participant is considered to not possess computed the scalar implicature. However the participant might have noticed the mismatch between the utterance and the array but have judged the mismatch not serious plenty of to require a rejection. In order to support this account Katsos and Bishop (2011) offered both children and adults with two complementary jobs. The 1st one was a binary view task; in the second task participants experienced to choose which array out of four best matched the prospective utterance (sentence-to-picture-matching paradigm). The results exposed that children accept an underinformative utterance significantly more often than adults in the 1st task; but when offered a choice among several alternatives they pick the picture that displays the pragmatic (scalar) interpretation of the phrase. Katsos and Bishop argued the results of the two jobs collectively support their hypothesis. In other words children understand a scalar implicature but they are more than adults to pragmatic violation. The two experiments we propose here applied.

Background Strong theoretical models suggest implicit learning deficits may exist among

Background Strong theoretical models suggest implicit learning deficits may exist among children with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD). for BMS-863233 (XL-413) repeated vs. novel configurations over time is also expected. In summary disturbances in frontostriatal neural loops may impair the ability of children with ADHD to acquire information implicitly. Or it may be that the use of that knowledge to guide behavior is impaired by the disruption of a separate neurocognitive mechanism. If the CC effect is diminished among children with ADHD the locus of that deficit could be due to problems (a) acquiring implicit knowledge in which case no CC effect would be seen on any index of performance (b) using that implicitly acquired information to guide their attention BMS-863233 (XL-413) in which case a CC effect would not be seen Colec11 for <.001. Although there was no effect of configuration was also faster BMS-863233 (XL-413) for repeated vs. novel configurations over time (Epoch×Configuration: for repeated vs. novel configurations over time (remaining two and three-way interactions all p>0.14; all η2<.02). Boundary separation (was narrower for children with ADHD (Diagnosis:>0.40 both η2<.007). However a marginally significant Epoch×Configuration×Diagnosis interaction was detected became faster and became smaller with practice for repeated vs. novel configurations. CC effects have been found in typically-developing children ranging in age from 5-14 years (Barnes et al. 2008 Barnes et al. 2010 Dixon Zelazo & De Rosa 2010 but see Vaidya et al. BMS-863233 (XL-413) (2007). This is however the first study of which we are aware that has demonstrated that both mechanisms are responsible for this effect in children. was slower among children with ADHD a finding that is consistent with performance on a variety of speeded RT tasks (C. L. Huang-Pollock et al. 2012 Karalunas & Huang-Pollock 2013 Karalunas et al. 2012 Metin et al. 2013 Despite this the rate at which improved for repeated vs. novel configurations was similar between groups. Children with ADHD are therefore capable of implicitly acquiring associative knowledge and are BMS-863233 (XL-413) able to use that knowledge to guide their attentional focus. These findings are consistent with previous work documenting normative automatic and effortful deployment of spatial attention in ADHD (C. Huang-Pollock & Nigg 2003 C. Huang-Pollock Nigg & Carr 2005 However was more narrow in children with ADHD and did not show the same flexibility observed among Controls who reduced for repeated configurations and increased for novel configurations. Thus children with ADHD are able to learn implicit associations and to use that information to guide their visual attention (as demonstrated by changes in in the speed condition was smaller for children with ADHD in the accuracy condition. Group differences in are not always found (C. L. Huang-Pollock et al. 2012 Karalunas & Huang-Pollock 2013 Karalunas et al. 2012 so together these data suggest that the most impairing aspect of performance among children with ADHD may best be conceptualized as a lack of flexibility in this parameter as opposed to a stable reduction in threshold. Interestingly this appears to be the case whether the required changes in threshold are consciously controlled through explicit changes in instruction (as in Mulder et al. 2010) or implicitly as in the current study. Recent theories (Nigg & Casey 2005 Sagvolden et al. 2005 have proposed that children with ADHD might have difficulties acquiring implicit knowledge or have difficulty utilizing that knowledge to adjust their behavior. Our results suggest the latter and encourage the field to shift from an almost exclusive focus on top-down executive processes to the examination of other theoretically relevant processes that may also be impaired in ADHD. Our findings also support a functional dissociation for the role of the MTL and striatum in the execution of the CC task. Whereas attentional guidance in the CC effect is believed to depend upon the MTL (Chun 2000 Chun & Phelps 1999 changes in response threshold have been linked to activity in the striatum (Forstmann et al. 2008 Ivanoff et al. 2008 Kuhn et al. 2011 The striatum but not MTL is implicated in ADHD and our findings of normative attentional guidance but impaired modulation of response threshold suggest that the processes that underlie the CC effect are dissociable at both a behavioral and a neural level. Non-decision time (was marginally slower for children with ADHD.